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Comments
FORECLOSURE BY POWER OF SALE INSERTED IN A MORTGAGE OR DEED OF TRUST
Of the several methods of foreclosing mortgages, probably the most favorable
for the mortgagee is by the exercise of a power of sale included in the mort-
gage or deed of trust.1 This method of foreclosure is favored by the creditor,
because it removes the necessity for judicial action that other forms of fore-
closure require.2 A few states, by statute or judicial decision, hold a power of
sale void as against public policy and require that the foreclosure be carried
on by other means.3 These latter states are more favorable to the debtor, and
give the mortgagor a greater degree of protection for his property interests.
However, where the power of sale is allowed, the courts commonly require strict
compliance with the terms of the power as included in the instrument.4
Where a power of sale is allowed, as it generally is, a provision is inserted
in the instrument empowering some person to sell the mortgaged property with-
out resort to judicial proceedings.5 There is little variation among the states
following the majority view as to who may exercise the power. In general, any
person of legal capacity in whom the legal estate or title under the mortgage
is vested may exercise the power.6 The person doing so must hold the legal
title,7 some states require, except in exceptional cases.8 Thus, in the majority
of the states today, either the mortgagee or trustee in a trust deed form of mort-
gage can exercise the power of sale. It would seem preferable to limit the
exercise of the power to someone other than the creditor-the trustee of the
deed of trust, for example, for the trustee stands in fiduciary relationship to
both the mortgagor and mortgagee. 9 This limitation of the exercise of the power
1. The validity of the power of sale is now recognized by the large majority
of the states. 19 R. C. L. 587; 3 JONES, MORTGAGES (8th ed. 1928) 788, 790;
41 C. J. 923.
2. 3 JONES, op. cit. supra note 1, at 786; 11 C. J. 704; 41 C. J. 922.
3. Idaho: Brown v. Bryan, 6 Idaho 1, 51 Pac. 995 (1898); Illinois: ILL.
REV. STAT. (Cahill, 1927) c. 95, § 24; Indiana: IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns, 1926)
§ 13,474; Iowa: IowA CODE (1924) §§ 12,372 and 12,373; Kansas: Samuel v.
Holliday, 1 Kan. 612 (1863); Kentucky: Campbell v. Johnston, 4 Dana 177 (Ky.
1836); Nebraska: Comstock v. Michael, 17 Neb. 288, 22 N. W. 549 (1885);
Oklahoma: OxIA. STAT. (Harlow, 1931) § 424.
4. Wolff v. Ward, 104 Mo. 127, 16 S. W. 161 (1891).
5. American Blower Co. v. MacKenzie, 197 N. C. 152, 147 S. E. 829, 64
A. L. R. 1047 (1929). 2 JONES, CHATTEL MORTGAGES (Bower's ed.) 561.
6. 3 JONES, op. cit. supra note 1, at 819.
7. Miller v. Clark, 56 Mich. 337, 23 N. W. 35 (1885); Burke v. Backus, 51
Minn. 174, 53 N. W. 458 (1892) ; H. Weil & Bros. v. Davis, 168 N. C. 298, 84 S. E.
395 (1915); Morris v. McKnight, 1 N. D. 266, 47 N. W. 375 (1890).
8. Stevens v. Shannahan, 160 Ill. 330, 43 N. E. 350 (1896).
9. A trustee in a deed of trust to secure a debt is the agent of the owner
of the property as well as the owner of the secured debt. Cassady v. Wallace,
102 Mo. 575, 15 S. W. 138 (1890) ; Axman v. Smith, 156 Mo. 286, 57 S. W. 105
(1900); Polliham v. Reveley, 181 Mo. 622. 81 S. W. 182 (1904).(186)
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to some disinterested person would seem to assure the mortgagor a greater de-
gree of protection than if the interested creditor himself were allowed to con-
duct the sale.'0 The creditor can sell the property in such a way as to bind the
debtor, and leave him with no recourse to any judicial proceedings,". unless the
creditor sells to himself or agent, in which case the debtor has an equitable
power to rescind.' 2 It would seem that some check should be placed on the credi-
tor in these cases.
Missouri makes valid the power of sale, when included in a chattel mortgage,
real estate mortgage, or deed of trust mortgage. 12 Thus under the law of Mis-
souri, the power of sale can be exercised by a trustee of a deed of trust, 3 a mort-
gagee of realty,' 4 or a mortgagee of chattels,' 5 where such a power is contained
in the instrument.
May the sale conducted under such a power be a private sale, or must it be a
public sale? It seems that the sale may be conducted privately, unless a public
sale is expressly required by the instrument itself or by statute.' 6 But where
the instrument itself,'7 or a statute, 8 requires the use of the public sale, a private
sale is void. There is a little more justification for allowing the private sale
where only the trustee can conduct the sale, than where the mortgagee himself
can be granted the power; but in either case, it seems rather hard to justify
the private sale. What harm can arise from requiring a public sale and notice
to the public? It is commonly stated by the courts that the purpose of the sale
is to get bids as favorable as possible for the mortgagor,1 9 and yet it seems
obvious that this aim will be furthered by a public, and frustrated by a private,
sale. The Missouri Supreme Court has said 20 that "In selling mortgaged prop-
erty under a deed of trust, the trustee must not indulge the slightest favoritism
or do aught to make the property bring less than otherwise it would." It seems
10. While in theory the trustee is a disinterested third party, in most in-
stances he is the nominee of the creditor. Often the trustee is partial to the
creditor. See, on this point, First National Bank v. Wright, 104 Mo. App. 242,
78 S. W. 686 (1904).
11. 41 C. J. 922; 3 JONES, op. cit. supra note 1, at 810.
12. Pueblo Real Estate, Loan & Inv. Co. v. Johnson, 119 S. W. (2d) 274
(Mo. 1938).
12a. Mo. Rav. STAT. (1929) § 3074.
13. Cassady v. Wallace, 102 Mo. 575, 15 S. W. 138 (1890).
14. Pickett v. Jones, 63 Mo. 195 (1876).
15. Waltner v. Smith, 274 S. W. 526 (Mo. App. 1925).
16. Marsh v. Elba Bank & Trust Co., 221 Ala. 683, 130 So. 323 (1930);
Marston v. Brittenham, 76 Ill. 611 (1875); Hebb v. Mason, 143 Md. 345, 122 AtI.
318 (1923); Martin v. Paxson, 66 Mo. 260 (1877); Mowry v. Sanborn, 68 N. Y.
153 (1877).
17. Greenleaf v. Queen, 1 Pet. 138 (U. S. 1828); Griffin v. Marine Co.,
52 Ill. 130 (1869); Williamson v. Stone, 128 Ill. 129, 22 N. E. 1005 (1889);
Heermans v. Montague, 20 S. E. 899 (Va. App. 1890).
18. Melsheimer v. McKnight, 92 Miss. 386, 46 So. 827 (1908); Lawrence v.
Farmer's Loan & Trust Co., 13 N. Y. 200 (1855).
19. Stoffel v. Schroeder, 62 Mo. 147 (1876).
20. Borth v. Proctor, 219 S. W. 72 (Mo. 1920).
1939]
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MISSOURI LAW BEVIEW[
that such ideals will be better protected where the sale is required to be in public,
and the element of competition is allowed more opportunity to operate.
In Missouri, the law has gone far toward destroying the protection that
seemingly should be granted the debtor in the field of chattel mortgages, but
has not been quite so harsh in the case of the real estate mortgage. As to chattel
mortgages, it has been held in several decisions, either expressly or by necessary
implication, that the sale can be conducted privately, with no notice to the public
or the mortgagor.21 However, by statute in Missouri 2l' it is required that in
any mortgage or trust deed of realty, where a power of sale is to be carried out,
there must be at least twenty days notice to the public. 22 A recent case shows the
court's criterion of what is a public sale sufficient to make the sale valid.23
A third question arises as to who can purchase at a sale conducted under
the exercise of a power of sale. Most courts have held that neither the trustee
of a deed of trust nor his agent can purchase at such a sale conducted by the
trustee; 24 nor can the mortgagee nor his agent purchase at such a sale con-
ducted by the mortgagee,25 unless this right be specifically given by the terms
of the power.28 (There seems to be no objection to a mortgagee purchasing
at a trustee's sale.) This rule seems eminently, just, for in spite of other safe-
guards furnished by the law, it would seem that allowing such parties to purchase
at sales conducted by themselves would be making it much easier for the per-
petration of fraud upon the debtor. Other courts, however, have allowed the
mortgagee to purchase at his own sale (public or private), but are much more
21. Parker v. Roberts, 116 Mo. 657, 22 S. W. 914 (1893); First National
Bank v. Wright, 104 Mo. App. 242, 78 S. W. 686 (1904) ; Nichols & Shepard Co.
v. Stokes, 196 S. W. 1075 (Mo. App. 1917).
21a. Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) § 3076.
22. Snell v. Harrison, 104 Mo. 158, 16 S. W. 152 (1891); Hoffman v. Big-
ham, 324 Mo. 516, 24 S. W. (2d) 125 (1930); Judah v. Pitts, 333 Mo. 301, 62
S. W. (2d) 715 (1933).
23. Bruner v. Stevenson, 73 S. W. (2d) 413 (Mo. App. 1934). Here no one
but the auctioneer and mortgagee paid any attention, although other persons
were within earshot.
24. Stephen v. Beall, 22 Wall. 329 (U. S. 1874); Holman v. Ryon, 56 F.
(2d) 307 (App. D. C. 1932); Lockridge v. Smith, 206 N. C. 174, 173 S. E. 36
(1934); Collier v. Ford, 81 S. W. (2d) 821 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935); Harrison v.
Manson, 95 Va. 593, 29 S. E. 420 (1898); Robinson v. Robinson, 112 W. Va.
39, 163 S. E. 633 (1932).
25. Lockett v. Hill, 15 Fed. Cas. No. 8,443 (C. C. N. D. Ga. 1874); Jackson
v. Blankenship, 213 Ala. 607, 105 So. 684 (1925); Watson v. Sherman, 84 Ill.
263 (1876); Cambridge Savings Bank v. Cronin, 289 Mass. 379, 194 N. E. 289
(1935); Byrd v. Clarke, 52 Miss. 623 (1876); Very v. Russell, 65 N. H. 646, 23
Atl. 522 (1874); Cleveland v. Bateman, 21 N. M. 675, 158 Pac. 648 (1915);
Morris v. Carroll, 171 N. C. 761, 88 S. E. 511 (1916); Galvin v. Newton, 19
R. I. 176, 36 Atl. 3 (1895).
26. Mortgage contracts, perhaps, should be considered contracts of adhesion,
since they are not contracts which are the result of negotiations of well-matched
opponents. Should not the court step in here and protect the mortgagor from
his utter inability to exclude such powers in the mortgagee to sell privately to
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strict in the case of the trustee.27 In the Missouri case, Parker v. Roberts,28 it
was held that the chattel mortgagee could purchase at his own private sale.
Missouri is among the latter group of courts,29 and holds that either the
chattel or real estate mortgagee can sell to himself or agent, although it alleviates
the harshness of this rule somewhat by allowing the mortgagor to disaffirm the
sale within a reasonable time thereafter. If the mortgagor tenders the debt due
within such reasonable time after such sale, he can redeem land or chattel from
the mortgagee, or his agent.30 Even so, this doctrine of Missouri seems to favor
the creditors, as it puts the burden on the debtor to take steps in abrogating a
sale which is unfavorable to him. However, it has been held that the trustee in
Missouri can neither directly nor indirectly become the purchaser at his own
foreclosure sale, and such a sale has been held absolutely void.3 '
In summarizing the Missouri law as to the scope and effect of the power of
sale as exercised under a mortgage or deed of trust, we see that Missouri has
gone very far in protecting creditors, especially in the field of the chattel mort-
gage. Where the power is authorized in the chattel mortgage instrument,
3 2
the power can be exercised either by the creditor himself33 or by the trustee,
who may in reality be practically the agent of the creditor;3 4 it can be conducted
in private, for no notice is required either to the public or the mortgagor;35 and
the person conducting the sale can sell either to himself or his agent, subject only
to the equitable power of redemption in the debtor.36
In the mortgage, or deed of trust, of real estate, the debtor is better pro-
tected, for although the mortgagee or his agent can purchase at a public sale
conducted by the mortgagee in exercising the power of sale,3 7 the sale must be
preceded by twenty days' notice to the public,38 and if the mortgagee or his agent
buys, the mortgagor's power of redemption is not cut off.39
27. The mortgagee must, as a matter of practical necessity, purchase at the
foreclosure, ordinarily. See the case of Brewer v. Harrison, 27 Colo. 349, 62
Pac. 224 (1900).
28. 116 Mo. 657, 22 S. W. 914 (1893).
29. Thornton v. Irwin, 43 Mo. 153 (1869); Allen v. Ranson, 44 Mo. 263
(1869); Medsker v. Swaney, 45 Mo. 273 (1870); Reddick v. Gressman, 49 Mo.
389 (1872).
30. See the recent Missouri case, Pueblo Real Estate, Loan & Inv. Co. v.
Johnson, 119 S. W. (2d) 274 (Mo. 1938).
31. Thornton v. Irwin, 43 Mo. 153 (1869); Duncan v. Home Co-operative
Co., 221 Mo. 315, 120 S. W. 733 (1909); Northcutt v. Fine, 44 S. W. (2d) 125
(Mo. 1931); Stark v. Love, 128 Mo. App. 24, 106 S. W. 87 (1907).
32. Keating v. Hannenkamp, 100 Mo. 161, 13 S. W. 89 (1889).
33. Waltner v. Smith, 274 S. W. 526 (Mo. App. 1925).
34. First National Bank v. Wright, 104 Mo. App. 242, 78 S. W. 686 (1904).
35. Parker v. Roberts, 116 Mo. 657, 22 S. W. 914 (1893). See First Na-
tional Bank v. Wright, 104 Mo. App. 242, 78 S. W. 686 (1904); Nichols &
Shepard Co. v. Stokes, 196 S. W. 1075 (Mo. App. 1917).
36. Parker v. Roberts, 116 Mo. 657, 22 S. W. 914 (1893). Here the mort-
gagee exercised the power of sale by selling to his own agent at a private sale.
37. Reddick v. Gressman, 49 Mo. 389 (1872).
38. Mo. Rnv. STAT. (1929) § 3076.
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It seems rather surprising that Missouri has gone so far in protecting the
creditor, rather than in safeguarding the debtor. The West has traditionally
favored the rural, debtor classes. It is submitted that this almost untrammeled
power of sale by the mortgagee might well be curtailed, for the creditor is
adequately protected by his right to possession after default, to public sale by a
disinterested trustee, and to judicial foreclosure. It should be recognized that the
debtor is actually, if not theoretically, at a disadvantage in dealing with his
creditor in the majority of the cases, and the law should give him reasonable
protection. In justification of the Missouri rule it is sometimes contended that
easy foreclosure is really to the advantage of the mortgagor, because he can
borrow more freely. Yet persons with adequate security have no trouble borrow-
ing in states with relatively more expensive foreclosure procedure, and in some
states at lower rates of interest. Persons without adequate security will have
great difficulty in borrowing, even with easy foreclosure laws.
GEORGE W. WIsn
LIABILITY OF MASTER FOR ASSAULT COMMITTED BY SERVANT EMPLOYED AS A
SPECIAL POLICE OFFICER
The liability of a master to third persons for the torts of his servant is said
to depend upon whether the servant was acting within the scope or course of his
employment.' Various factors are weighed and diverse tests employed in de-
ciding this question. None in and of itself alone is conclusive,2 the phrase "course
of employment" or "scope of authority" having no fixed legal meaning.8 The
primary difficulty with cases involving assault usually lies in the element of
motive-assault being a willful act of the type usually done to serve the actor's
own personal ends. In order to hold the master liable, it is ordinarily stated
that the act under consideration must be done with the purpose, in some part
at least, of furthering the master's business.4 Where the servant's assigned
1. MECHE, LAW OF AGENCY (3rd ed. 1923) § 499; RESTATEMENT, AGENCY
(1933) § 219 (1) ; Saucer v. Willys-Overland, 49 F. (2d) 385 (S. D. Fla. 1935) ;
Eyerly v. Baker, 168 Md. 599, 178 Atl. 691 (1935); Nelson Business College Co.
v. Lloyd, 60 Ohio St. 448, 54 N. E. 471 (1899); Union Gas & Electric Co. v.
Crouch, 123 Ohio St. 81, 174 N. E. 6 (1930); Westerland v. Argonaut Grill, 185
Wash. 411, 55 P. (2d) 819 (1936).
2. (1931) 6 WIs. L. REv. 239; RESTATEMENT, AGENCY (1933) § 229.
3. 39 C. J. 1282; Loper v. Yazoo & M. V. R. R., 166 Miss. 79, 145 So. 743
(1933).
4. Mullins v. Ritchie Grocer Co., 183 Ark. 218, 35 S. W. (2d) 1010 (1931);
Stinson v. Prevatt, 84 Fla. 416, 94 So. 656 (1922); Alden Mills v. Pendergraft,
149 Miss. 595, 115 So. 713 (1928) ; State ex rel. Gosselin v. Trimble, 328 Mo. 760,
41 S. W. (2d) 801 (1931); Collette v. Rebori, 107 Mo. App. 711, 82 S. W. 552
(1904); Wrightsman v. Glidewell, 210 Mo. App. 367, 239 S. W. 574 (1922);
Sturgis v. Kansas City Rys., 228 S. W. 861 (Mo. App. 1921); Grier v. Grier, 192
N. C. 760, 135 S. E. 852 (1926) ; Westerland v. Argonaut Grill, 185 Wash. 411,
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duties are such that conflicts ordinarily arise in their performance, and the
servant does commit an assault in the course of his attempted performance of
those duties, most courts experience little trouble in holding the master liable. 5
An example of employment which is likely to lead to conflict is employment as
a detective or police officer, or employment for police purposes. In such cases it
would seem easier to find the assault within the scope of the servant's employ-
ment than where he is engaged in other more placid employment. The intent
to further the master's business can well be found here, not only partially, but
predominantly. The master might reasonably be held to have expected and have
foreseen violence as a consequence of the assigned duties.
When the special police officer is attempting to secure a confession from a
person suspected of stealing from his employer and during his attempt commits
assault, it requires no stretch of the imagination to say the servant acted with
the intent of furthering his master's business and in a manner reasonably to be
expected. In White v. Pacifio Telephone and Telegraph Co.,6 a case of assault
by the chief special agent of the telephone company during an attempt to secure
a confession from a person suspected of robbing the company's office, the court,
quoting the Restatement of the Law of Agency, 6' stated three general criteria of
scope of employment: (1) the conduct must be of the type the servant is em-
ployed to perform; (2) it must take place substantially within the authorized
time and space limit; and (3) the act must be done with at least the partial
purpose of furthering the master's business. The court held that on the record no
question of fact was presented as to (1) and (2), and that only as to the third
test was there any question. As to this, the opinion states that because of the
nature of the employment, the jury could well find, as it did, that the servant
was actuated, in part at least, by a desire to serve his master. The master, the
telephone company, was held liable. In Mansfield v. Burns International De-
tective Agency,7 a somewhat similar case of assault while attempting to obtain
a confession, emphasis was placed upon the test of intent to forward the mas-
ter's business. Because of the type of work the detective was hired to do, the
court held that the necessary intent could reasonably be found. The cases in-
dicate that courts emphasizing the requirement of intent to forward the master's
business have a tendency to construe broadly the intent of the servant to serve
the master and to hold the master liable in an assault case arising out of the
servant's performance of duties in the nature of a policing function.8
5. RESTATEMENT, AGENCY (1933) §§ 212(e), 215, 245; MECHEM, LAW
OF AGENCY (3rd ed. 1923) § 545; Shear v. Singer Sewing Mach. Co., 171 Fed.
678 (E. D. Pa. 1909); Johnson v. Monson, 183 Cal. 149, 190 Pac. 635 (1920);
Howe v. Newmarch, 94 Mass. 49 (1866).
6. 24 F. Supp. 871 (D. Ore. 1938).
6a. § 228.
7. 102 Kan. 687, 171 Pac. 625 (1918).
8. McClure Ten Cent Co. v. Humphries, 33 Ga. App. 523, 127 S. E. 151
(1925); Personal Finance Co. of Macon v. Whiting, 48 Ga. App. 154, 172 S. E.
111 (1933); Matthews v. New York, C., & St. L. R. R., 93 Ind. App. 618, 161
1939]
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Where the company policeman is instructed to conduct investigations gen-
erally and to engage in similar functions without making arrests or personal
contacts, it is more difficult to discover an intent to forward the company's busi-
ness when assault is committed. Of course, an instruction not to use violence
will not prevent an assault from being within the scope of employment.0 In such
situations the master has been held on the theory that the servant's duties being
such that conflicts ordinarily arise from them, the master cannot be insulated
from liability when the foreseen conflict does arise by a direction to use no force.
In Pilipovich v. Pittsburgh Coal Co.,10 an industrial policeman of the coal com-
pany killed an innocent bystander several minutes after a dispute between em-
ployees and strikers had occurred. The court held that if a special policeman is
placed in a position of responsibility where conflict may arise and force may have
to be used, following which the special officer uses more force than necessary, he
is not acting outside of the scope of his employment as a matter of law. Au-
thority seems abundant on the point that the work of a private detective or
policeman is of the type from which conflict may be expected and that the em-
ployer is liable for assault arising out of the conflict." Occasionally, however,
a modern case disregards the social basis of respondeat superior and reverts to
the older form of statement that a master is not liable for the willful act of his
servant unless he authorized or directed the willful act.e 2 These cases, however,
in the recent reports, seem to be few in number. It is submitted that such a test
fails to stress the social policy which is the basis of the doctrine of respondeat
superior.18
If the special officer is commissioned by a municipality or a state but receives
his remuneration from a private employer, another element is injected. 14 In mak-
ing the assault was the special officer performing his public duties or was
he serving his private master? The fact that the special officer was com-
missioned by a unit of the government does not in itself prevent his act
from being within the scope of employment of the private individual employing
him.15 There are cases stating that where the special agent holds a commission,
N. E. 653 (1928); Knowles v. Bullene & Co., 71 Mo. App. 341 (1897); W. T.
Grant Co. v. Owens, 149 Va. 906, 141 S. E. 860 (1928). In general, as to test
of intent to further master's business, see Note (1909) 18 L. R. A. (9. S.) 416.
9. RESTATEMENT, AGENCY (1933) § 212 (b), (e); Ford v. Grand Union
Co., 240 App. Div. 294, 270 N. Y. Supp. 162 (3rd Dep't 1934),
10. 314 Pa. 585, 172 Atl. 136 (1934); see RESTATEmENT, AGENCY (1933)
§ 230 (c).
11. New Ellerslie Fishing Club v. Stewart, 123 Ky. 8, 93 S. W. 598 (1906);
Deck v. Baltimore & 0. R. R., 100 Md. 168, 59 Atl. 650 (1905); Adams v. St.
Louis-San Francisco Ry., 251 S. W. 124 (Mo. App. 1923); Robbs v. Missouri
Pac. Ry., 210 Mo. App. 429, 242 S. W. 155 (1922) ; see MECHEM, LAW oF AGENCY
(3rd ed. 1923) §§ 545, 546; Note (1931) 75 A. L. R. 1176, 1178.
12. St. Louis & S. F. R. R. v. Wyatt, 105 S. W. 72 (Ark. 1907); Wright
v. Automobile Gasoline Co., 250 S. W. 368 (Mo. 1923).
13. Smith, Frolic and Detour (1923) 23 CoL L. REv. 716.
14. For general discussion on the similar problem of liability for false ar-
rest, see Notes (1925) 35 A. L. R. 681, (1932) 77 A. L. R. 933.
15. Alabama Fuel & Iron Co. v. Baladoni, 15 Ala. App. 316, 73 So. 205
(1915); Matthews v. New York, C. & St. L. R. R., 93 Ind. App. 618, 161 N. E.
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a presumption arises that he was acting in his capacity as a public official.'6
The desirability of the use of a presumption, rebuttable or otherwise, is ques-
tionable. The problem is one of scope of employment only. The officer might
have acted in either a public or private capacity. Or he might have acted in a
dual capacity. The fact that he received a municipal or other commission in the
past seems to have little bearing upon the question of whether or not he has acted
under the commission in the incident under consideration. This is recognized
by the majority of cases.17 If the officer was acting entirely or partly in the
scope of the private employer's business, the employer is liable for the tortious
act.' s If he was acting in his public capacity, the private employer is not liable.' 9
Thus, in Maggi v. Pompa,20 a special policeman, paid by Pompa but commissioned
by the city of San Francisco, injured an innocent bystander when attempting
to make an arrest for a disturbance of the peace. It was held that the private
individual was not liable because the injury was caused by the special police-
man's attempt to perform his public duty.
As in other agency cases involving tort liability, the special agent may be
an independent contractor or furnished by an independent contractor.2' If so,
the independent contractor is liable and not the person (the alleged "master")
who has entered into the contract with him. Thus in Niles V. Marshall Field
& Co., 22 a special detective commissioned by the city of Chicago assaulted a cus-
tomer of the Marshall Field Company. The detective was paid by a detective
agency from which he received his orders, the Marshall Field Company having
entered into a contract with the agency whereby the agency agreed to furnish
(1927); Walters v. Stonewall Cotton Mills, 136 Miss. 361, 101 So. 495 (1924);
Brady v. Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry., 71 S. W. (2d) 303 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934); Wilhelm
v. Parkersburg, M. & I. Ry., 74 W. Va. 678, 82 S. E. 1089 (1914).
16. Maggi v. Pompa, 105 Cal. App. 496, 287 Pac. 982 (1930); LaChance v.
Berlin Street Ry., 79 N. H. 291, 109 Atl. 720 (1919); Bunting v. Pennsylvania
B. R., 284 Pa. 117, 130 Atl. 306 (1925); McKain v. Baltimore & 0. R. R., 65
W. Va. 233, 64 S. E. 18 (1909); Moss v. Campbell's Creek R. R., 75 W. Va. 62, 83
S. E. 721 (1914).
17. Zygmuntowicz v. American Steel & Wire Co. of N. J., 240 Mass. 421,
134 N. E. 385 (1922); Hudson v. St. Louis, Southwestern Ry., 293 S. W. 811
(Tex. App. 1927); Brady v. Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry., 71 S. W. (2d) 303 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1934); Notes (1925) 35 A. L. R. 681. (1932) 77 A. L. R. 933, I,. R. A.
1915C, 1183.
18. Kusnir v. Pressed Steel Car Co., 201 Fed. 146 (S. D. N. Y. 1912); Mass.
Cotton Mills v. Hawkins, 164 Ga. 594, 139 S. E. 52 (1927); Matthews v. New
York, C. & St. L. R. R., 93 Ind. App. 618, 161 N. E. 653 (1928); Armstrong
v. Stair, 217 Mass. 534, 105 N. E. 442 (1914); Walters v. Stonewall Cotton
Mills, 136 Miss. 361, 101 So. 495 (1924); Brady v. Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry., 71 S. W.
(2d) 303 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934).
19. Roll v. Springfield Cons. Ry., 225 Ill. App. 411 (1922); Neallus v.
Hutchinson Amusement Co., 126 Me. 469, 139 Atl. 671 (1927); Ruffner v. Jamison
Coal & Coke Co., 247 Pa. 34, 92 At. 1075 (1915) ; Lawrence v. Crescent Amuse-
ment Co., 8 Tenn. App. 216 (1928); Note (1932) 77 A. L. R. 933.
20. 105 Cal. App. 496, 287 Pac. 982 (1930).
21. Note (1932) 19 VA. L. REV. 83.
22. 218 Ill. App. 142 (1920).
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and take charge of the house detectives. It was held that the detective was in
the employ of an independent contractor and, therefore, the Marshall Field
company was not liable for his actions. In the type situation involving the private
detective, or watchman, the alleged master's defense of independent contractor
might be attacked as in similar situations where such defense is set up, by show-
ing such master's personal fault-for example, his selection of an individual
with a known proclivity towards violence. That is, while it is undoubtedly
true as a general proposition that an independent contractor and not his em-
ployer is liable for injuries caused by the work,23 nevertheless the master re-
mains liable for his own faults in selection or delegation.24 Should he employ
an incompetent or improper contractor, as for instance, in this case one with
known tendencies to use excessive force, then the alleged master is liable on
general principles of tort, aside from any doctrines peculiar to the law of agency.
HARRY P. THOMSON, JR.
MEASURE OF DAMAGES WHERE BREACH OF COVENANT FOR TITLE
Where there is a breach of a covenant for title contained in a deed of land,
there is an action for damages by the grantee-covenantee against the grantor-
covenantor, and the court is confronted with the often perplexing problem of what
is the proper measure of damages assessable to compensate the covenantee for his
loss. It would seem to be a relatively simple matter to lay down a rule for the
determination of such, but upon closer analysis, it is evident that various factual
situations will arise which make it impossible to set out an abstract rule which
will do justice in all cases.
The damages generally assessed for breach of any contract are in accordance
with the loss actually suffered by the complaining party at the time of the
breach. This is true at least in so far as that loss may be said to have been
contemplated by the parties at the time of entering into the contract. In de-
termining what damages were contemplated by the parties, we look to evidence
of conditions as they existed at the time the contract was entered into, and the
breaching party will be liable only for such damages as might have been rea-
sonably foreseen by the parties at that time.
23. Thayer v. Kirchhof, 83 Colo. 480, 266 Pac. 225 (1928); General Re-
fractories Co. v. Mozier, 235 Ky. 252, 30 S. W. (2d) 952 (1930); Aubuchon v.
Security Const. Co., 291 S. W. 187 (Mo. App. 1927); Kulin v. P. J. Carlin Const.
Co., 154 Misc. 892, 278 N. Y. Supp. 635 (Sup. Ct. 1935); Riverland Oil Co. v.
Chisholm, 143 Okla. 120, 287 Pac. 379 (1930).
24. MECHER, LAW OF AGENCY (3rd ed. 1923) §§ 497, 498, 511; RESTATE-
MENT, AGENCY (1933) § 245(e); Baker v. Scott County Milling Co., 323 Mo.
1089, 20 S. W. (2d) 494 (1929); Kuhn v. P. J. Carlin Const. Co., 154 Misc. 892,
278 N. Y. Supp. 635 (Sup. Ct. 1935); see Eger v. Helmar, 272 Mich. 513, 262
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However, when dealing with a breach of a covenant for title, even though
certain damages were or clearly should have been within the contemplation
of the parties at the time of making the covenant, and could have been reason-
ably foreseen, they may not be recoverable by the covenantee against the cove-
nantor. For example, in such a sale of real estate it is clearly within the con-
templation of the parties that the value of the land may be either increased or
decreased, either through the efforts of the covenantee, or due to other causes.
However, according to a majority of the decisions, this is not considered a proper
element of damages.' The reason for this attitude of the courts is not altogether
clear, but it is often intimated that such increase or decrease would be too much
a matter of conjecture.
Where there has been a total failure of title to the estate conveyed, the
general rule as to the measure of damages for breach of a covenant which is
breached at the time of making is the value of the property at such time, plus
whatever interest might have accrued. 2 This is determined by the amount of
consideration paid by the covenantee to the covenantor. The consideration paid
is, in fact, generally deemed conclusive as to the value of the land.3 However,
whether the consideration paid was or was not considered conclusive would make
little difference, because the reason for using the amount of consideration as
the measure of damages is that the courts feel the covenantee should be com-
pensated for the actual loss suffered at the time of making, and this would, in
any event, be the consideration he had paid to the covenantor. 4 So, in any case,
the most that could be recovered would be the consideration paid because this is
the extent of the loss.
1. Prestwood v. Carlton, 162 Ala. 327, 50 So. 254 (1909); Wade v.
Texarkana Bldg. & L. Ass'n, 150 Ark. 99, 233 S. W. 937 (1921); Emmert v.
Jelsma, 191 Iowa 424, 182 N. W. 652 (1921); Crenshaw v. Williams, 191 Ky.
559, 231 S. W. 45 (1921); Staton v. Henry, 130 Miss. 372, 94 So. 237 (1922);
Lawless v. Collier's Ex'rs, 19 Mo. 480 (1854); Hazelett v. Woodruff, 150 Mo.
534, 51 S. W. 1048 (1899); Staed v. Rossier, 157 Mo. App. 300, 137 S. W. 901
(1911); Quick v. Williams, 219 Mo. App. 336, 271 S. W. 834 (1925); Campbell
v. Bentley, 159 App. Div. 522, 145 N. Y. Supp. 92 (4th Dep't 1913).
2. Lloyd v. Sandusky, 203 Ill. 621, 68 N. R. 154 (1903); Rockafellor v.
Gray, 194 Iowa 1280, 191 N. W. 107 (1922) ; Hutchins v. Roundtree, 77 Mo. 500
(1883); Adkins v. Tomlinson, 121 Mo. 487, 26 S. W. 573 (1894); Hazelett v.
Woodruff, 150 Mo. 534, 51 S. W. 1048 (1899). In Lawless v. Collier's Ex'rs,
19 Mo. 480, 483 (1854), the court said: "The weight of American authority has
determined that the covenant for seizin is broken, if broken at all, as soon as it
is made, and thereby, an immediate right of action accrues to him who has re-
ceived it. . . . The damages to be recovered are measured by the actual loss at
that time sustained." But see the subsequent development in the treatment of
this covenant, in Note (1938) 3 Mo. L. REV. 48. Also see Werner v. Wheeler,
142 App. Div. 358, 127 N. Y. Supp. 158 (1st Dep't 1911); Murphy v. Price,
48 Mo. 247 (1871); Falk v. Organ, 160 Mo. App. 218, 141 S. W. 1 (1911);
Frank v. Organ, 167 Mo. App. 493, 151 S. W. 504 (1912); Jeffords v. Dreisbach,
168 Mo. App. 577, 153 S. W. 274 (1913). See also RAWLE, COVENANTS FOR TITLE
(5th ed. 1887) §§ 184, 186.
3. See Collier v. Gamble, 10 Mo. 467 (1847); Bircher v. Watkins, 13 Mo.
522 (1850). See also the cases cited note 2, supra.
4. Lawless v. Collier's Ex'rs, 19 Mo. 480 (1854); Brusco v. Pate, 51 R. I.
222, 153 Atl. 311 (1931). See the cases cited note 2, supra.
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Often, when there is a breach of such covenant, although the breach occurs
immediately, the holder of the paramount title will not evict the covenantee for
some time, or in some instances, not at all. Thus it would seem to follow
logically that where this covenant is broken, the covenantee is entitled to recover
no more than nominal damages 5 until he has bought in the adverse rights or
has been actually deprived of the whole subject of his bargain, in either of
which latter events he is entitled to recover substantial damages.0 Until there
has been an injury of some kind to the covenantee, there has obviously been only
a technical legal breach and he should not be permitted to recover damages for
an injury not actually suffered.
There are a few cases however, which have permitted the recovery of sub-
stantial damages even though the covenantee has not been evicted and ap-
parently suffered no substantial loss. 7 These cases reason that a covenant of
seisin is breached when made, if there is an outstanding paramount title or en-
cumbrance, even though the grantee takes and retains possession of the premises.
From this it follows that the measure of damages would be the consideration
paid if there was a total failure of title, and a proportionate part of the con-
sideration if the title to only a part failed. This is clearly a minority view.
Where there is a breach of the covenant of warranty or other covenants
where breach does not occur at the time of making, but which is prospective
in character, the measure of damages is likewise generally said to be the value
of the property at the time of making the covenant, and this value is also de-
termined by the consideration paid the covenantor.8
5. Alger-Sullivan Lbr. Co. v. Union Trust Co., 218 Ala. 448, 118 So. 760
(1928); Collier v. Gamble, 10 Mo. 467 (1847); Bircher v. Watkins, 13 Mo. 522(1850). In Duke v. Tyler, 209 Iowa 1345, 230 N. W. 319 (1930), the court held
that the breach was only technical and recovery of substantial damages was
not authorized until some loss or injury has been suffered by the covenantee. Also
see Anderson v. Olson, 65 N. D. 550, 260 N. W. 407 (1935).
6. Prescott v. Trueman, 4 Mass. 627 (1808); Lawless v. Collier's Ex'rs,
19 Mo. 480 (1854) ; Henderson v. Henderson's Ex'rs, 13 Mo. 151 (1850) ; Magwire
v. Riggin, 44 Mo. 512 (1869); Walker's Adm'r v. Deaver, 79 Mo. 664 (1883);
Matheny v. Stewart, 108 Mo. 73, 17 S. W. 1014 (1891); Holladay v. Menifee, 30
Mo. App. 207 (1888). But see Mitchell v. Hazen, 4 Conn. 495 (1823).
7. Mather v. Stokely, 218 Fed. 764 (C. C. A. 1st, 1915); Harris v.
Newell, 8 Mass. 262 (1811). In Parkinson v. Woulds, 125 Mich. 325, 84 N. W.
292 (1900), defendant had conveyed land to the plaintiff to which he had no
title and plaintiff went into possession. Subsequently an action was brought for
breach of a covenant of warranty. Plaintiff was entitled to recover the con-
sideration paid, with interest, notwithstanding her possession had been undis-
turbed, since the breach accrued when the deed was made. See Hilliker v.
Rueger, 228 N. Y. 11, 126 N. E. 266 (1920); also RAWLE, COVENANTS Fr TIam
(5th ed. 1887) § 186.
8. Beach v. Nordman, 90 Ark. 59, 117 S. W. 785 (1909); Brawley v.
Copelin, 106 Ark. 256, 153 S. W. 101 (1913); Hanlon v. Conrad-Kammerer
Glue Co., 53 Ind. App. 504, 102 N. E. 48 (1913); Alexander v. Staley, 110 Iowa
607, 81 N. W. 803 (1900); Staton v. Henry, 130 Miss. 372, 94 So. 237 (1922);
Tong v. Matthews, 23 Mo. 437 (1856); Murphy v. Price, 48 Mo. 247 (1871);
Matheny v. Stewart. 108 Mo. 73, 17 S. W. 1014 (1891); Hazelett v. Woodruff,
150 Mo. 534, 51 S. W. 1048 (1899) ; Coleman v. Lucksinger, 224 Mo. 1, 123 S. W.
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When the failure of title is only to a portion of the land, there would seem
to be little difficulty in reaching a correct result if the general rule is carried
to its reasonable and logical end. Such an application of the rule as afore-
mentioned would logically result in the awarding of damages to the covenantee
by determining what amount of the purchase price was paid for the portion
of land to which title failed. A correct statement of this application was made in
the Missouri case of Quick v. Williaws, 9 where the court said: "The general rule
for the measurement of the damages in case of failure of title to a portion of
the land conveyed is that the vendee can recover only such part of the original
purchase price as bears the same ratio to the whole consideration that the value
of the land to which the title has failed bears to the value of the whole premises,
such relative values to be ascertained as of the time of the conveyance instead
of the time of the trial, together with interest and costs."
It is also quite possible that, before or after the grantee-covenantee has
been evicted from all or a part of the land conveyed by the person holding the
paramount title thereto, the covenantee will buy in the paramount title and re-
enter the premises. In such a situation as this, applying the general rule that
the covenantee can recover from the covenantor for the actual loss sustained, it
would seem logically to follow that the covenantee could only recover the amount
expended by him in obtaining such paramount title, provided, of course, that
such amount be less than the original consideration paid to the covenantor.1 o
There are some cases which follow the rule commonly known as the New
England rule. This view distinguishes between covenants which are breached
immediately upon being made, and those which are prospective in character and
are not breached until some time following the conveyance and after the
covenantee has obtained possession and enjoyment of the land.U Where such a
distinction is made, in assessing the damages for breach of a covenant prospective
in character, the general rule of damages is applied, but, at the same time, there
is care exercised so that no unfairness will be done to either party. The idea
of this rule is to give effect to the real intention of the parties. It appears reason-
ably certain that both parties intend that title to the land should become vested
in the purchaser. It is also contemplated that, if the value of the land in-
creases, he should receive the benefit therefrom, and, if such value decreases, he
Williams, 219 Mo. App. 336, 271 S. W. 834 (1925); Hunt v. Hay, 214 N. Y.
578, 108 N. E. 851 (1915).
9. 219 Mo. App. 336, 339, 271 S. W. 834 (1925).
10. MeGary v. Hastings, 39 Cal. 360 (1870). See, also, the 6ases cited in
notes 2 and 7, supra.
11. Horsford v. Wright, 3 Kirby (Conn. 1786); Sterling v. Peat, 14 Conn.
245 (1841); Beecher v. Baldwin, 55 Conn. 419, 12 Atl. 401 (1887); Cushman v.
Blanchard, 2 Me. 266 (1823); Hardy v. Nelson, 27 Me. 525 (1847); Gore v.
Brazier, 3 Mass. 523 (1807); Norton v. Babcock, 2 Mete. 510 (Mass. 1841);
Cecconi v. Rodden, 147 Mass. 164, 16 N. E. 749 (1888); Park v. Bates, 12 Vt.
381 (1840). To distinguish, see the following cases where breach of the covenant
of seisin: Montgomery v. Reed, 69 Me. 510 (1879); Staples v. Dean, 114 Mass.
125 (1873); Downer's Adm'rs v. Smith, 38 Vt. 464 (1866).
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should sustain the loss. To effectuate this result the New England courts have
adopted the rule that damages shall be assessed according to the value of the land
at the time of eviction. This rule is clearly stated in the early Connecticut case
Sterling v. peet, 12 where the court said: "We consider the rule to have been
long since settled in this state, that upon the covenant of seisin, the plaintiff
has a right to recover the consideration money, and the interest, and on the
covenant of warranty, the value of the land, at the time of eviction."
Clearly, the rigid application of this New England rule for measuring the
damages will effectuate results widely varied from those that would be reached
under the general rule of assessing damages according to the value at the time of
the conveyance. But, from the covenantee's position at least, the fairness of
this rule seems clear if cognizance is taken of the possible hardship to him which
would frequently be meted out if the general and majority rule were strictly fol-
lowed. If the covenantee is deprived of the benefit of an increased value, or if
the covenantor is required to bear the burden of a depreciation in value, there
would seem to be effected a perversion of the basic principles applicable to the
assessment of damages for breach of contract. Tils view is followed in the New
England states, at least so far as the extent of the profits from the increase
in value can be said to have been fairly within the contemplation of the parties at
the time of the making of the covenant.1 3
It is clear that under the majority rule which limits the damages recoverable
by the covenantee, where breach of a covenant prospective in nature, to the
consideration actually paid or to the actual value of the land at the time of enter-
ing into the covenant, there may result unlimited hardship to the covenantee.
In view of this, the first question which invariably comes up is: What induced
the courts to establish and follow such a rule that obviously violates the well
established principles for assessing damages in breach of contract actions, that
a man can recover in damages for the loss he has sustained?14 The majority
rule hardly seems in accordance with these general principles.
One strong reason for adopting the majority rule was the fear that to assess
the damages as of the time of eviction would put an extreme burden on the
covenantor.15 This was probably the most important reason for the adoption of
such a rule, and under such reason the rule has been termed meritorious be-
cause it limits the liability of the covenantor to the contract, and he cannot be
held for unforeseen damages arising through the appreciation in the value of the
12. 14 Conn. 245, 254 (1841).
13. See the cases cited in note 11, supra.
14. Kahn v. Schoen Silk Corp., 147 Md. 516, 533, 128 Atl. 359 (1925)
("The underlying principle of damages for the breach of a contract is com-
pensation; or, in other words, to award such a sum in money as would put the
injured party in the same position as if the contract had been fully performed
by the party responsible for its breach").
15. Pitcher v. Livingston, 4 Johns 1 (N. J. 1809); Moreland v. Metz, 24




Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1939
COMMENTS
premises.1 Usually the covenantor believes his title is good, else he would not be
willing to insert covenants. Therefore, courts have tried to protect him by
limiting the extent of his liability. But the same argument may be made to all
contracts entered into.
The fallacy of any reason given in favor of the rule is made obvious by at-
tempts to apply the rule to concrete sets of facts. Such practical application
shows clearly the desirability of the minority rule.17 Thus the result seems to
be that the courts following the majority view have elected to favor the wrong-
doer at the expense of the party wronged.
If the minority rule is properly applied, it is sufficiently flexible to permit
damages to be regulated so as to avoid undue hardship to the covenantor. For
example, damages for extensive improvements generally would not be recovered
from the covenantor because the covenantee would probably 'have been allowed
compensation for them as a condition precedent to the eviction, and if not, such
would not normally be within the contemplation of the parties, and hence not
recoverable. If such improvements were within the contemplation of the parties,
there would seem to be little doubt that the wrongdoer should be the one to bear
the loss.
A final, though relatively unimportant, advantage which the minority rule
seems to have is that in applying the other rule, often it proves difficult to de-
termine the consideration paid or the actual value of the land at the time of
entering into the covenant, because so often the consideration is not stated in
the deed and there may have been a considerable lapse of time since the deed
was delivered; but it would seem a comparatively simple matter to secure evidence
to prove the value of the premises at the time of eviction.
In such actions for breach of a covenant for title there is generally the
question of whether or not the covenantee will be permitted to recover interest
on the money expended by him. Where the covenant is one which is breached
immediately upon being entered into, the general rule is that the measure of dam-
ages is the amount of consideration paid plus interest thereon. 18 On the ques-
tion of whether or not such interest should be recovered where no title or pos-
16. Wiggins v. Stephens, 246 S. W. 84 (Tex. App. 1922) where the court
said: "The liability of the covenantor is fixed by his contract, and so firmly is
it thus fixed, in reason and in the decisions of our courts, that the person evicted
has as many different measures of damages from which to choose as there are
different considerations stipulated in the deeds of the various grantors in his
chain of title."
17. Matheny v. Stewart, 108 Mo. 73, 17 S. W. 1014 (1891); Coleman v.
Lucksinger, 224 Mo. 1, 123 S. W. 411 (1909); Threlkeld v. Fitzhugh, 2 Leigh
451 (Va. 1830).
18. Peters v. Bowman, 98 U. S. 56 (1878); Burton v. Price, 105 Fla. 544,
141 So. 728 (1932); McInnis v. Lyman, 62 Wis. 191, 22 N. W. 405 (1885). In
Otey v. Oakey, 157 Va. 314, 321, 160 S. E. 8 (1931), the court said: "It is
settled in Virginia that the measure of damages for breach of the covenant of
the right to convey where nothing passes by the decd is the consideration paid,
with interest." See Hutchins v. Roundtree, 77 Mo. 500 (1883). Also, see cases
cited in note 2, supra.
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session passes, the fairness of allowing such recovery seems unquestionable, and
the courts permit it as a matter of course without giving the question much con-
sideration.19
When the covenant breached and sued on is one prospective in character,
the rule is generally stated to be that the covenantee is entitled to recover the
original purchase money with interest.20 However, where the covenantee has
had the possession and enjoyment of the land for a period prior to the eviction,
the courts are confronted with a more difficult problem, if they choose to recog-
nize it. Even here the courts often overlook the fact that the covenantee has
had possession in return for the use of his money, and simply apply the abstract
rule for measuring the damages by awarding the covenantee the purchase price
plus interest.21 From a practical point of view it seems wholly unjust to per-
mit the covenantee to receive both the use of the land and interest on the money
expended by him. What seems to be the correct and just principle to apply
was set out by the Supreme Court of Missouri in the early case of Hutchins v.
Roundtree,22 where the court said: "Between vendor and vendee the conceded
rule is to regard the interest the equivalent of the use of the land and, 0 converso,
the use of the land the equivalent of the use-the interest-of the purchase
money." On this principle then, it would seem that where the covenantee has had
the use of the land for a certain time, he should not be allowed recovery of in-
terest on the purchase money during such period.
The final problem usually presented is whether or not the covenantee can
recover for the expenses of litigation incurred in defending the title conveyed to
him by the covenantor. It is generally held that the grantor-covenantor is not
liable for such expenses incurred in a suit by a third person against the grantee,
if such suit is successfully defended by the grantee, and it appears that the
third person had neither a legal nor equitable claim to the premises granted.
The reason given for such a rule is that, since the action is determined favor-
ably to the covenantee, this establishes the fact that there was no flaw in the
title, and if there is no flaw in the title, then there has been no breach of the
covenant for title. 23 This rule is well founded and the good faith of the
19. See note 18, supra.
20. See Beach v. Nordman, 90 Ark. 59, 117 S. W. 785 (1909); McCormick
v. Marcy, 165 Cal. 386, 132 Pac. 449 (1913); Eaton v. Hopkins, 71 Fla. 615,
71 So. 922 (1916); Rowan v. Newbern, 32 Ga. App. 363, 123 S. E. 148 (1924);
Crowley *. McCambridge, 154 Ill. App. 135 (1910); Emmert v. Jelsma, 191
Iowa 424, 182 N. W. 652 (1921); Staton v. Henry, 130 Miss. 372, 94 So. 237
(1922); Matheny v. Stewart, 108 Mo. 73, 171 S. W. 1014 (1891); Quick v.
Williams, 219 Mo. App. 336, 271 S. W. 834 (1925).
21. See cases note 20, supra.
22. 77 Mo. 500, 505 (1883). See also, Frazier v. Bd. of Supervisors of
Peoria, 74 ll. 282 (1874); Collins v. Thayer, 74 Ill. 138 (1874).
23. Rittmaster v. Richner, 14 Colo. App. 361, 60 Pac. 189 (1900); Up-
church v. White, 37 Ga. App. 100, 139 S. E. 81 (1927); Mackenzie v. Clement,
144 Mo. App. 114, 129 S. W. 730 (1910); Eaton v. Clarke, 80 N. H. 577, 120
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covenantee in defending the title or the formidable appearance of the third
party's claim will make no difference, since the rule is based on the fact that
there was no failure of title rather than the appearance of failure.24 It has
been reasoned that such a rule does not put an intolerable burden on the grantee
for when he is sued by the adverse claimant he may, by proper notice and demand
made upon the grantor, relieve himself of all duty, and transfer to those liable
on the covenant the peril of defending or allowing a default judgment to be en-
tered.25 Whether this would give the grantee full protection or not seems doubt-
ful since he may have made improvements or otherwise altered his position
with respect to the premises so as to make it imperative that an effective de-
fense be established.
Where the adverse claim had a legal, even though not an equitable, founda-
tion, the grantee may often recover the expenses of successfully defending against
it if he has complied with the requirements of notice to, and demand upon,
the grantor. 26 Examples of such cases are where the adverse claimant had the
legal title but had been barred by the statute of limitations; 27 or where the action
was dismissed for some other reason.28 The reason assigned for such decisions
is that the covenantee is entitled to reimbursement for costs incurred in defend-
ing all lawful claims, and since the adverse claimant in these cases has legal
title, he has a lawful claim even though his remedy may be barred or fail for
other reasons.
The same general principles are applicable to a suit brought by the grantee
to establish his title against third persons, as where he is defending his title
in a suit brought against him. Before the grantor can be held liable for the
expenses of litigation, the third party must have a lawful claim. So, when the
grantee successfully brings suit to establish his title against third persons who
were without any valid claim to the premises, he cannot recover the expenses
of the litigation from the grantor.29
In general, when the expenses of litigation are recoverable, a reasonable at-
24. In Mackenzie v. Clement, 144 Mo. App. 114, 129 S. W. 730 (1910), the
court said: "To allow the mere good faith of the grantee, based on the formidable
appearance of the claim made by one assailing his title, to be the criterion
governing the liability of the warrantor on his warranty against 'lawful claims,'
would render the position of such warrantor exceedingly hazardous. . . . The
claim of the claimant must be superior to the title conveyed. 'The grantor does
not warrant that no one shall make a claim of adverse title but only that no one
shall make a claim which shall be adjudged paramount to the title conveyed
by this deed.'"
25. Eaton v. Clarke, 80 N. H. 577, 120 Atl. 433 (1923).
26. Meservey v. Snell, 94 Iowa 222, 62 N. W. 76 (1895); Smith v. Keeley,
146 Iowa 660, 125 N. W. 669 (1910); Hazelett v. Woodruff, 150 Mo. 534, 51
S. W. 1048 (1899).
27. Smith v. Keeley, 146 Iowa 660, 125 N. W. 669 (1910).
28. Hazelett v. Woodruff, 150 Mo. 534, 51 S. W. 1048 (1899).
29. Rittmaster v. Richner, 14 Colo. App. 361, 60 Pac. 189 (1900); Thorne
v. Clark, 112 Iowa 548, 84 N. W. 701 (1900); Luther v. Brown, 66 Mo. App.
227 (1896); Fishel v. Browning, 145 N. C. 71, 58 S.' E. 759 (1907).
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torney's fee is considered as a proper expense and is recoverable along with the
purchase money, interest, and other costs. But in Missouri, an early case 30
contained a dictum that the measure of damages is limited to the purchase money,
interest, and costs. However, this dictum was overruled by a later decision 2 '
by the Missouri Supreme Court which established, in Missouri, the general rule
that attorney's fees are recoverable where a breach of the covenant for war-
ranty, if the grantee notified the grantor to defend and the grantor failed. There
would seem to be no reason why this rule should not be extended to breaches of
the other covenants for title.
DAvD R. HARDY
30. Matheny v. Stewart, 108 Mo. 73, 17 S. W. 1014 (1891), where the
grantee defended a useless cause and was refused recovery of attorney's fees.
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